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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P laint i ff/Respondent, 
v. 
ALLEN BOYD MILLER, 
Defendant/AppeI I ant. 
PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI, 
RULE 46 
Case No. 
Priority No. 2 
PURSUANT TO RULE 46 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT, APPELLANT HEREBY SUBMITS THE 
FOLLOWING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI: 
1. Questions Presented for Review: 
(A) Did the Court of Appeals finding that the affida-
vit in this case established probable cause sufficient to justify 
the issuance of a search warrant conflict with prior decisions of 
this court? 
(B) If probable cause to search was not actually 
established, should the evidence seized as a result of the subse-
quent search be admitted under the Leon good faith exception or 
under applicable state law? 
(C) Does the "Utah Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act" 
violate protections guaranteed by both the federal and state 
constitutions therefore requiring this court to grant this peti-
tion pursuant to Rule 43(2) of the Rules of Supreme Court? 
2. The Court of Appeals decision in this case is found at 
Utah Adv.Rep. (Ct. App. 8-17-87). (See Appendix C) 
3. Grounds on which jurisdiction of this court is based: 
(A) Date of decision sought to be reviewed - August 
17, 1987. 
(B) There have been no rehear ings in this case nor 
have there been any requests for extensions of time to file. 
(C) Not appI icable. 
(D) The statutory provisions that petitioner believes 
confer jurisdiction on this court to review the Court of Appeals 
decision, is Rule 43, subsections 2 and 4, of the Rules of Utah 
Supreme Court. 
4. The constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to this 
pet i t i on are: 
(A) The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, which reads as follows: 
The right of people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
(B) The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, Section 1, which states: 
All persons born or naturalized in 
the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and 
of the state wherein they reside. 
No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of laws. 
(C) Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
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The right of the people to be 
secure In their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
(D) Utah Code Annotated (1982 as amended), <<78-16-1 
et seq. and 77-35-12 (see appendix A ) . 
5. Statement of the Case. 
(A) Nature of the case. 
Petitioner was charged by Information with Produc-
tion of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, on or 
about August 1st, 1985. 
(B) Course of the proceedings and disposition in 
lowers courts. 
Petitioner was tried without a jury on June 19th, 
1986, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Judith Billings presiding. The court, after hearing 
all the evidence, found petitioner guilty, and on August 29th, 
1986, sentenced him to six months in the Salt Lake County jail, 
followed by probation with Adult Probation and Parole for a 
period of eighteen months. 
On September 12th, 1986, petitioner filed a notice 
of appeal to the district court. On September 30, 1986, peti-
tioner filed a docketing statement with this court, which subse-
quently transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals. On 
August 17th, 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court% s ruI i ng. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Appellant, on or about August 1, 1985, resided at 7889 
South 3850 West, West Jordan, Utah. On that date a search war-
rant (a copy of which Is attached hereto as Exhibit 2) was issued 
authorizing the police to search appellant's residence and all 
structures and vehicles located on the property. The warrant was 
based upon an affidavit (a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 1) filed by Detective Stewart Smith. In the affidavit, 
Officer Smith testified that the following facts were true and 
correct: 
(A) Certain of Miller's neighbors complained about 
"unusual traffic" in the neighborhood; 
(B) Officer Smith observed and photographed three 
storage sheds, two swamp coolers which blew cool air into boarded 
up windows, a furnace and accompanying vent stacks, and a series 
of lights placed upon a swamp cooler; 
(C) Certain unidentified neighbors have observed 
Miller mixing up peat moss on his premises; 
(D) Some cars were seen leaving Miller's house after a 
short stay early in the morning; 
(E) One of the cars seen in the morning hours belonged 
to a "known drug user"; 
(F) On an undisclosed number of occasions, a U-HauI 
truck has been parked by Miller's house which unidentified neigh-
bors have heard being loaded and unloaded at night; 
(G) Unidentified neighbors have not seen Miller's 
garage door open; 
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(H) Unidentified neighbors have seen two large dogs 
with Mi I ler; 
(1) Miller's power bills are higher than normal and he 
pays the bills without protest; 
(J) Miller "has prior illegal possession charges for 
possession of psilocybin mushrooms, 1/4 pound and possession of 
mar i juana"; 
(K) Franklin Spain, who has been arrested for posses-
sion of marijuana in the last year, resides at Miller's house; 
(L) Credit reports given to the power company show 
Miller to be self employed and doing business as Miller's Auto 
Body Shops, which did not seem to exist. 
(Exhibit 1 ) . 
After listing these facts, Officer Smith concluded that 
each item observed around appellant's home could DOSSi bIV be used 
to cultivate marijuana or other possible illegal substances. 
(Exhibit 1) After approximately six weeks of surveillance, 
Officer Smith confirmed the unidentified neighbors' reports of 
the presence of the above listed property items. (Exhibit 1). 
Officer Smith further testified that these facts justified a "no 
knock" warrant. Based upon the foregoing, the magistrate found 
that there was probable cause to believe that there were marijua-
na plants and illegal mushrooms on the appellant's premises. 
Upon executing the warrant, police seized several items 
which they claimed were marijuana plants and personal property 
allegedly used in the production of controlled substances. 
Appellant made a motion to suppress the evidence seized and a 
suppression hearing was held in the district court on February 6, 
1986. At the hearing, appellant called Officer Smith and ques-
tioned him as to the veracity of the factual statements contained 
in the affidavit. As to the alleged cohabitation of appellant 
and Franklin Spain, Officer Smith testified that he never ob-
served Mr. Spain at appellant%s residence during the six weeks 
surveillance period. Officer Smith based his conclusory state-
ment upon an address given by Mr. Spain when he was arrested over 
a year before the affidavit was prepared. (Tr. 9, 10) As to 
his statement in the affidavit that one of the cars visiting 
appellant%s residence was registered to a "known drug user", 
Officer Smith testified that he was referring to a Vann Larson. 
(Tr. 10) Officer Smith concluded that Vann Larson was a "known 
drug user" because he has previously been arrested for possession 
of narcotics paraphernalia. (Tr. 10, 11) However, Officer Smith 
admitted that he knew that those same charges against Mr. Larson 
had been dismissed. (Tr. 11) Officer Smith admitted that he had 
never seen Vann Larson use drugs. (Tr. 11) With regard to the 
U-HauI truck parked by appellant's house, Officer Smith testified 
that he never saw the truck filled with marijuana or any other 
illegal substance. (Tr. 11) Mr. Smith saw only soil additive 
and conditioners stacked around the truck. (Tr. 12) 
"Tr." refers to the transcript of the suppression hearing held 
on February 6, 1985. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS FINDING THAT THE AFFIDA-
VIT IN THIS CASE ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE 
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF A 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPROPER AND DIRECTLY 
CONFLICTS WITH PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
In I I I inols v. Gates. 462 US 213 (1983), the United 
States Supreme Court rejected Aau Mlar v. Texas. 378 US 108 
(1964) and So IneI I I v. United States. 393 US 410 (1969) which, in 
combination had been applied and known as the Aau Mlar 
So I ne I I I test. This test had required that affidavits based on 
information from informants must contain facts sufficient to 
establish the basis of the informant's knowledge and the infor-
mant's veracity and reliability. 
In Gates the court substituted that test with a "total-
ity of the circumstances" analysis, which is defined as follows: 
Whether given all the circumstances set forth 
in the affidavit before [the magistrate], 
IncIud i ng the veracity and basis of knowledge 
of persons supplying information, there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence 
of a crime will be found in a particular 
place. And the duty of a reviewing court is 
simply to ensure that the magistrate has a 
substantial basis for ... concluding that 
probable cause existed. Jji- at 219 (emphasis 
added). 
This court in State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 
1985), announced that it would follow the Gates test. See a I so. 
State v. Espinoza. 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). In Anderson, this 
court stated: 
Nevertheless, In State v. Bai lev. [675 P.2d 
1203 (Ut. 1984)], we observed that even under 
the Gates "totality of the circumstances" 
standard, compliance with the AauI I Iar 
So i neI I I guidelines might be necessary to 
establish the requisite "fair probability" 
that the evidence sought actually exists and 
can be found where the informant so states. 
Id. at 1101. 
Petitioner submits that the facts contained in the 
affidavit in the instant case are such that they do not establish 
a "fair probability" that the evidence sought actually would be 
found at the location. Petitioner further submits that the Court 
of Appeals decision conflicts with the rule of Anderson and Gates 
and, therefore, the petition should be granted. In this regard, 
petitioner urges this court to review the Affidavit of the inves-
tigating Officer (Smith) wherein each of the supporting facts is 
recited. Although these facts support a suspicion that something 
was going on at petitioner's residence, such facts do not estab-
lish a "fa Ir probabl I Ity". 
It is important to note that Officer Smith's affidavit 
contained both facts received from anonymous neighbors of peti-
tioner as well as information produced from a police investiga-
tion into petitioner's background. All these facts in the affi-
davit, taken together, were found by the district court to have 
established probable cause under the "totality of the circum-
stances" test set forth in Gates and applied by this court in 
previous decisions. However, at the suppression hearing of 
February 6, 1986, Officer Smith testified that he did not in fact 
"know" that Mr. Vann Larson had ever been convicted of drug 
possession nor had he ever seen Mr. Larson use illegal drugs. 
Officer Smith's conclusory statement was: 
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A traffic survey of the area identified 
several cars for which ownership records 
identified a known drug user coming and going 
from the premises in the early morning hours. 
These vehicles stay only a short time then 
leave. (See Appendix) 
This statement was both false and, in addition, mis-
leading; implying, as it does, that more than one automobile in 
the area belonged to a "known drug user". Another allegation 
contained In Officer Smith's affidavit was that petitioner had 
prior charges for possession of 1/4 pound of psilocybin mushrooms 
and marijuana. (Exhibit 1) In fact, petitioner has never been 
charged with possession of psilocybin mushrooms and a 1984 charge 
of possession of marijuana was dismissed without an adjudication 
of guilt. Again, Officer Smith's use of conclusory language in 
his affidavit gives rise to a misleading representation of the 
facts. 
In another part of his affidavit, the officer alleged 
that a Mr. Spain, who had been arrested over a year before for 
marijuana possession, had "the same address" as petitioner. In 
fact, Mr. Spain did not reside at petitionees home during any 
part of the period which Officer Smith spent observing the pre-
mises. Officer Smith acknowledged that he never observed Mr. 
Spain at the house. It should be noted that, of all the allega-
tions contained In his affidavit, only these three had any overt 
reference to Illegal drugs. All three allegations were in some 
part, misleading. The contents of the other allegations, sepa-
rated from the incorrect and spurious information of the three 
allegations regarding Mr. Larson, Mr. Spain, and petitioner, are 
by themselves, insufficient to support a finding of probable 
cause. By including the false information implying that the 
petitioner's home was a center for "drug users", the officer%s 
affidavit became more substantial. However, it was still insuf-
ficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. Allegations 
contained in Officer Smith's affidavit should be deemed too 
insubstantial to support the magistrate's finding that probable 
cause existed. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE SEARCH 
WARRANT CLEARLY LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE, THE 
OFFICERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RELY ON 
LEON'S "GOOD FAITH' EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLU-
SIONARY RULE. 
In United States v. Leon. 104 S.Ct. 2405 (1984) the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that "the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in 
the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers 
acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a 
detached and neutral magistrate, but ultimately found to be 
unsupported by probable cause". United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 
at 3409. However, in reaching its decision the Court cautioned: 
...Nevertheless, the officer's reliance on 
the magistrate's probable cause determination 
and on the technical sufficiency of the 
warrant the issues must be objectively rea-
sonable, and It is clear that in some circum-
stances the officer will have no reasonable 
grounds for believing that the warrant was 
proper Iy Issued... 
Nor would an officer manifest objective good 
faith in reiving on a warrant based pn an 
affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render affiant's belief In LLs. 
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existence unreasonable. la. at 421-22. 
(emphasis added) 
The facts set forth In the affidavit and the conduct of 
Officer Smith have been discussed at length and need not be 
repeated. Those facts clearly establish two points. First, the 
affidavit was so lacking In factual Information upon which to 
support a finding of probable cause that Officer Smith%s belief 
that probable cause existed was objectively unreasonable. In 
addition, petitioner submits that pursuant to Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah State Constitution, the good faith exception does 
not apply to this case. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH FOURTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER BOTH THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Court of Appeals decision failed to address this 
particular argument in its decision. However, because of its 
importance, petitioner submits it as a basis upon which to grant 
the petition in the instant case. 
The Utah State legislature has attempted to create and 
codify its own good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in 
passing the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act, Utah Code Annotat-
ed, <78-16-1, et sea. Section 78-16-5 thereof states: 
No evidence which Is otherwise competent and 
admissible shall be excluded from any crimi-
nal proceeding because of the violation of 
Fourth Amendment rights except evidence 
which, though otherwise admissible, was 
secured in a method which involved a substan-
tI a I violation of Fourth Amendment rights as 
provided in subsection 77-35-12(g). Id. 
(emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated, <77-23-12 defines "substantial" in 
the following manner: 
Pursuant to the standards described in <77-
35-12(g) property or evidence seized pursuant 
to a search warrant shall not be suppressed 
at a motion, trial or other proceeding unless 
the unlawful conduct of the peace officer is 
shown to be substantial. Any unlawful search 
or seizure shall be considered substantial 
and in bad faith if the warrant was obtained 
with malicious purpose and without probable 
cause or was executed maliciously and will-
fully beyond the authority of the warrant or 
with unnecessary severity. J_d. (emphasis 
added) 
Utah Code Annotated, <77-35-12(g) states: 
(1) In any motion concerning the admissibil-
ity of evidence or the suppression of evi-
dence pursuant to this section or at trial, 
upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, 
the suppression of evidence shall not be 
granted unless the court finds the violation 
upon which it is based to be both a substan-
t I a I violation and not committed in good 
faith. The court shall set forth its reason-
ing for such finding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in 
all cases be deemed substantial if one or 
more of the following is established by the 
defendant or applicant by a preponderance of 
the evidence: 
(i) The violation was gross I v nea i i -
aent. willful, ma I icious. shocking to the 
conscious of the court or was a result of the 
practice of law enforcement agency pursuant 
to a general order of that agency, 
(ii) The violation was intended only to 
harass without legitimate law enforcement 
purposes. Id. 
From these statutory provisions, it is clear that a 
defendant must prove that the constitutional violation was both 
"substantial", i.e., grossly negligent, willful, malicious, or 
shocking to the conscience of the court, and not committed in 
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good faith. As defined In Utah Code Annotated, <76-2-103: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) ...willfully with respect to the nature 
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
4c 4c * 
(3) Recklessly, or ma I iciousI v. with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware of 
but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
These are the burdensome elements which a defendant must prove in 
order to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. It is important to note that this Utah Act explicitly 
applies only to the federal constitution, i.e., the Fourth Amend-
ment, and not to the Utah constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
Fourth Amendment only requires that a defendant prove that "the 
officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit 
or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in 
the existence of probable cause" in order to avoid admission 
under the good faith exception. United States v. Leon. 104 S.Ct. 
at 3410. Since the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act was passed 
before Leon. there is bound to be some incongruence between the 
Utah State Legislature's and the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule. 
However, as set forth above, the incongruence is not slight 
because <77-35-12 defines good faith In a way which does not 
comport at all, to Leon' s good faith definition. For this rea-
son, the statute violates the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the 
added burden placed upon a defendant under the Utah act goes far 
beyond that which is required by the federal constitution, as 
interpreted by Leon. and renders this statutory framework uncon-
stitutional under both the federal and state constitutions. 
If this court should find that the Utah act is in fact con-
stitutional, then appellant submits that the facts and circum-
stances of this case establish a violation of the <77-35-12, et 
sea. Officer Smith's misstatements in the affidavit were the 
product of gross negligence and/or made willfully or maliciously 
to misinform the court. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner contends that the facts and testimony in-
cluded in Officer Smith's affidavit were insufficient as a mat-
ter of law to support a finding that probable cause existed to 
issue a search warrant for petitioner's residence. Further, 
petitioner submits that the "good faith" exception created by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Leon is inapplicable to the present case 
because Officer Smith's reliance upon the warrant was objectively 
unreasonable in that the affidavit upon which it was based 
clearly failed to establish probable cause. Finally, petitioner 
requests this court to address the important question of consti-
tutional law raised buy the incongruity between the requirement 
of Utah Code Annotated, <<78-16-1, fii sea.. and 77-23-12 and the 
good 
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faith exception to the exclusionary rule as defined in Leon. 
Because of the foregoing, appellant suggests that the court 
should grant this petition for writ of certiorari in order that 
these questions may be fairly resolved. 
Dated this day of August, 1987. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
EARL XAIZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of August, 1987, 
I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to 
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
§77-35-12(q), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended: 
(g)(1) In any motion concerning the admissibility of 
the evidence or the suppression of evidence pursuant to this 
section or at trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, 
the suppression of evidence shall not be granted unless the court 
finds the violation upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in good faith. The court 
shall set forth its reasons for such finding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in all 
cases be deemed substantial if one or more of the following is 
established by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of 
the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, 
willful, malicious, shocking to the conscience of the court or 
was a result of the practice of the law enforcement agency 
pursuant to a general order of that agency; 
(ii) The violation was intended only to harass 
without legitimate law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was 
acting in good faith under this section, the court shall 
consider, in addition to any other relevant factors, some or all 
of the following: 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search 
and seizure standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will tend to 
deter future violations of search and seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was proceeding 
by way of a search warrant, arrest warrant, or relying on 
previous specific directions of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant establishes that 
the search or seizure was unlawful and substantial by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the peace officer or governmental 
agency must then, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the 
good faith actions of the peace officer. 
, I . "TED" CANNON 
)unty Attorney 
1: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN 
>puty County Attorney 
>urtside Office Building 
U East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
dt Lake City, Utah 84111 
\one: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'ATE OF UTAH ) 
) : SS 
)untu of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
:FORE: 450 South 200 East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
36 undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
lat he has reason to believe 
lat (X) on the premises known as 7889 South 3850 West, West Jordan, Utah 
i the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now 
-rtain property or evidence described as: 
irijuana plants and/or mushrooms in various stages of cultivation, grow lights, 
iltivating paraphernalia, packaging materials, ledgers, drying equipment, seeds, 
itting soil and containers and bank receipts 
id zhat said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
?f iant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the 
:ime(s) of Cultivation and Possession of Controlled Substance. 
PACE WO C^jt-d-JL * 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT Q ^ *ii^U, >*^U*M^ 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
On June 14, 1985, upon receipt of complaints of unusual traffic in the 
neighborhood of suspect premises by neighbors, affiant and other members 
of the State of Utah Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement began investi-
gation and surveillance of said suspect premises. In plain view observation 
of premises affiant observed and photographed the residence showing three 
large steel storage sheds to rear; two swamp coolers that blow continually 
and empty into boarded up and bermed basement area; a furnace like 
apparatus with two large vent stacks are seen in garage area where windows 
are also boarded up, but are visible from roof line and when side door 
is open; a series of lights commonly used for crow lights were observed 
and photographed on swamp cooler; and neighbors have observed occupants 
of residence mixing up peat moss although the yard has never been cared 
for or cultivated in any fashion. A traffic survey of the area identified 
several cars for which ownership records identified a known drug user 
coming and going from the premises in the early morning hours. These 
vehicles stau onlv a short time then leave. 
On numerous occasions a U-Haul truck has been located to the rear of 
the garage and neighbors have heard loading and unloading from the side 
door which is not as readily observable as the front garage door. This 
loading seems to occur at odd hours late at night. Neighbors have never 
seen the large garage door open. Neighbors reported seeing two large 
dogs with occupants when they were mixing peat moss, but most of the 
time the dogs remain inside. 
Contact with Utah Power and Light showed service lines coming into the 
home three times larger than required of that size residence. Monthly 
power consumption four to five times in excess of normal, with one bill 
for $2 ,f00.00 Jrwhich suspect paid when meter reader came to read the meter. 
Utah Power and Light has been denied access to meter by Miller and has 
paid any bill without contest. The suspect, Allen B. Miller has prior 
illegal possession charges for possession of psilacybin mushrooms, 1/4 
pound and possession of marijuana. Franklin David Spain of the same 
address has also been arrested for possession of marijuana in the last 
year. Miller according to neighbors acts very secretive when observed 
around premises. 
Affiant, a trained narcotics officer knows that peat moss is used for 
growing marijuana and mushrooms and has observed numerous stacks of 
plastic buckets at the residence, knows that furnaces can be used to 
dry plants for useage, and that swamp coolers can vent and humify plants 
being grown in a basement as at suspect premises. Large electrical 
consumption would be used to facilitate grow lights and drying equipment; 
and the truck used to load shipments for periodic distribution or final 
cultivation of plants at another growing site. Credit report shows 
suspect Miller self-employed with Miller's autobody shop which does not 
seem to exist. Suspect truck observed at residence never has tools 
in i t . Surveillance termination 1200 hours, August 1, 1985. 
^J -U-^AJ 
PAGE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential 
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from an unnamed 
source). Neighbors are private citizens whose reports have been observed 
and verified by affiant and photographed. Photographs are presented to 
magistrate as part of probable cause statement. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential 
informant to be correct and accurate through the following idenpendent 
investigation: continuous surveillance from June 14, 1985 to August 1, 
1985 in which traffic survey and photographic surveillance, and background 
investigations confirmed neighbor's reports. 
WHEREFORE: the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure 
of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to believe 
it is necessary to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destrbyedr damaged, or altered, or for other 
good reasons, t o - w i t ; 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing the 
requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's authority 
or purpose because: 
(X) physical harm may result to any person if notice were given; 
or 
(x) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
Two large watch dogs are always present and might pose a hazard to 
arresting officers. 
AFTXXNT ^ ~ T~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME thi$ / day of August, 1985. 
JUDdEwIN"ttl}j?FTH tfLRCUIT^COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
— ~[UiH>^jl\ cloedji>ui fiuf-ftttT?ij /.re. <uvu/ &// /S^Ztow^. //'sn'^s 
f{0 f&tcrd;
 0f a /44r'//esf eZLt/b &?du a^d /?<*>'*-£? U*f £e*nsi 
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EXHIBIT 2 
.L. "rnr cANSON 
ounty Attorney 
y: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN 
eputy County Attorney 
ourtside Office Building 
31 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
hone: (801) 363-7900 
JN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COUMT, SALT LA)IE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
OUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
o any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
roof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Officer 
Tiith - NLLEB, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
bat (X) On the premises known as 7889 South 3850 West, West Jordan, Utah, 
to include residence structure and any and all other structures apd 
vehicles on said property
 / yter&S£, SK?&$> CV^d. O^nixO \ ^ f\)C JC 
i the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now 
ertain property or evidence described as: 
zrijuana plants and/or mushrooms in various stages of cultivation, grow lights, 
jltivating paraphernalia, packaging materials, ledgers, bank receipts, drying 
juipment, seeds, potting soil and containers 
id that said property or evidence: 
.(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; 
(X) is being possessed with the purport of use i t as a means of committing 
or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
ou are therefore commanded: 
(X) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown) 
(X) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof under 
oath being shown that the objec t of this search may be guickly 
destroyed or disposed of or that harm may result to any person if 
notice were given) 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
to wake a search of the above-named or described premises for the herein-
above described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part 
thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth Circuit Court, County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject 
to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 
APPENDIX B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant. 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of qo contest; of the offense of ' LJU ti ll t LI! l L , a felony 
of the ^ ' ' degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by > ". and the State being represented by ^  Ll_i \ ' , is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
• to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D ; 
• • Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
D Commitment shall issue 
DATED this day of Li 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: _ 
Defense Counsel 
• , t* * -
Deputy County Attorney Page " ' of _1 
(White—Court) (Green—Judge) (Yellow—Jail/Pnson/AP&P) (Pink—Defense) (Goldenrod—State) 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No. ,',. / . L. 
Count No. L 
Honorable iSf/.i > .tJ i. . < • 
Clerk . ' • '/ 
Reporter i : ,.", : 
Bailiff •• "• f 
Date • • •• / 
, 19 
DISTRICT COURT ^lUDGE 
Judgment/State v. / , * 
TTTT iM JGR : i ~ 7 ; : ' /Honorable i-*Jl i I 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
• ^ . - > • 
HHJsual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. -
D Serve •'- . ' M / ' * / . < -.•,• - . . , / / » " / 5» ' ' .> , : - > ' < ; / t n ^ A r J ^ 
/ , , '>. JL JL. -£-L-in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing 
©•'Pay a fine in the amount of $,ir v r D a t a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or D at the rate of ; 
D Pay restitution in the amount of $. 
CZ3 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any* **l -.' 
>; or • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
; or • at a rate to be determined by 
program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any • educational; and/or • vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or • with 
. training • as directed by the Department of Adult • Participate in and complete any 
Probation and Parole; or D with 
• Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs, 
til- Submit to drug testing. 
Q'Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
O Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
G3' Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
• Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Obtain and maintain full-time emplpyment. 
23-Maintain full-time employment. '/••'" 'V> ' . . '.":.• •# . / ' . / /"<-*/,• 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
• Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
Q Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with : 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation "^  
and Parole. 
• Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of 
D Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
(4 l>'t < i.C 
days in jail 
• Defendant is ordered to appear before thjs Court on 
D 
D 
D 
• 
D 
// 
. for a review, of this sentence. 
L i i / <:• t '<• \s Hf'tS ••<'•< / / / • ' 
DATED this day of. 
DISTRICT COURT JU^GE • 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) OPINION 
) (For Publication) 
v. ) 
Allen Boyd Miller# ) Case No, 
) f 
Defendant and Appellant. ) } 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood and Garff.: 
BENCH, Judge: I 
Defendant Allen Boyd Miller appeals his conviction for 
production of a controlled substance. We affirm. 
On August 1, 1985, a search warrant was issued and 
executed authorizing police officers to search defendant's 
residence and all structures and vehicles located on the 
property. The warrant was based on an affidavit filed by 
Detective Stewart Smith of the State Bureau of Narcotics and 
Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement. Upon executing the 
warrant, officers seized several items which they believed were 
marijuana plants and personal property used in the production 
of controlled substances. Defendant was charged by information 
with production of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) 
(1987). Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence 
seized pursuant to the search. After a hearing on February 6, 
1986/ the trial court denied defendant's motion. The case was 
tried to the court on June 19, 1986 on stipulated facts. The 
only issue at trial was whether the State's evidence proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt the plants cultivated by defendant 
and seized by police were marijuana. In a memorandum decision 
filed July 1, 1986, the trial court concluded the State had met 
its burden and found defendant guilty as charged. 
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress because the affidavit filed in support 
of the search warrant failed to establish probable cause, 
contained false or misleading statements, and failed to justify 
a wno knock- search warrant. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has established the standards of 
review applicable to the instant case. In State v. Romero, 660 
P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983), the Court ruled, "A reviewing court 
should pay great deference to a magistrate's determination of 
probable cause." Furthermore, in State v. Galleaos, 712 P.2d 
207, 208-09 (Utah 1985), the Court held, -this Court will not 
disturb the ruling of the trial court on questions of 
admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears that the 
lower court was in error." 
Detective Smith's affidavit in support of the search 
warrant reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
On June 14, 1985, upon receipt of complaints 
/ of unusual traffic in the neighborhood of 
^ suspect premises by neighbors, affiant and 
other members of the State of Utah Narcotics 
and Liquor Law Enforcement began 
investigation and surveillance of said 
suspect premises. In plain view observation 
of premises affiant observed and photographed 
the residence showing three large steel 
storage sheds to rear; two swamp coolers 
that blow continually and empty into boarded 
w up and bermed basement area; a furnace like 
apparatus with two large vent stacks are seen 
in garage area where windows are also boarded 
up, but are visible from roof line and when 
side door is open; a series of lights 
commonly used for grow lights were observed 
^ and photographed on swamp cooler; and 
neighbors have observed occupants of 
.^residence mixing up peat moss although the 
yard has never been cared for or cultivated 
in any fashion. A traffic survey of the area 
^ identified several cars for which ownership 
records identified a known drug user coming 
and going from the premises in the early 
morning hours. These vehicles stay only a 
-''short time then leave. 
On numerous occasions a U-Haul truck has been 
located to the rear of the garage and 
neighbors have heard loading and unloading 
from the side door which is not as readily 
observable as the front garage door. This 
" loading seems to occur at odd hours late at 
night. Neighbors have never seen the large 
garage door open. Neighbors reported seeing 
, . two large dogs with occupants when they were 
~" mixing peat moss, but most of the time the 
dogs remain inside. 
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Contact with Utah Power and Light showed 
service lines coming into the home three 
times larger than required of that size 
residence. Monthly power consumption four 
to five times in excess of normal, with 
one bill for $2,400.00 which suspect paid 
when meter reader came to read the meter. 
Utah Power and Light has been denied 
access to meter by Miller and has paid any 
bill without contest. The suspect, Allen 
B. Miller has prior illegal possession 
charges for possession of psilacybin 
mushrooms, 1/4 pound and possession of 
marijuana. Franklin David Spain of the 
same address has also been arrested for 
possession of marijuana in the last year. 
Miller according to neighbors acts very 
secretive when observed around premises. 
Affiant, a trained narcotics officer knows 
that peat moss is used for growing 
marijuana and mushrooms and has observed 
numerous stacks of plastic buckets at the 
residence, knows that furnaces can be used 
to dry plants for usage, and that swamp 
coolers can vent and humify plants being 
grown in a basement as at suspect 
premises. Large electrical consumption 
would be used to facilitate grow lights 
and drying equipment; and the truck used 
to load shipments for periodic 
distribution or final cultivation of 
plants at another growing site. Credit 
report shows suspect Miller self-employed 
with Miller's autobody shop which does not 
seem to exist. Suspect truck observed at 
residence never has tools in it. 
Smith, based on his experience as a narcotics officer, 
concluded the above information, when considered cumulatively, 
established probable cause that defendant was engaged in 
cultivating marijuana or other illegal substances. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and 
article one, section fourteen of the Utah Constitution both 
require a finding of "probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation- prior to issuance of a search warrant. The United 
States Supreme Court, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 
(1983), redefined the test to determine whether an affidavit 
establishes the necessary probable cause: 
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The task of the issuing magistrate is 
simply to make a practical, commonsense 
decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before him, including the 'veracity* and 
•basis of knowledge' of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found in a particular 
place. And the duty of a reviewing court 
is simply to ensure that the magistrate 
had a 'substantial basis for . . . 
concluding] ' that probable cause existed. 
Id. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 
271 (1960). The Utah Supreme Court adopted the Gates "totality 
of the circumstances- standard in State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099 (Utah 1985), agreeing to review an affidavit win its 
entirety and in a common-sense fashion . . . .- id. at 1102. 
In reestablishing the "totality of the circumstances" test, the 
United States Supreme Court rejected the former 
"Aguilar-Spinelli" test1 as "hypertechnical and divorced from 
[reality]." Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U. S. 727, 732 (1984). 
In the instant case, the trial court, in its memorandum 
decision, reviewed all the information presented in Smith's 
affidavit. Acknowledging the training and experience of the 
officer, the court found, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the affidavit contained sufficient information 
to establish probable cause for a warrant. 
Defendant argues the affidavit failed to address the 
veracity or reliability of the unidentified informant 
neighbors. Although no longer a required test under the Gates 
standard, the veracity or reliability of an informant is still 
a relevant consideration when reviewing the totality of the 
circumstances. Gates, 462 U. S. at 230; see also State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987). However, the average 
neighbor witness is not the type of informant in need of 
independent proof of reliability or veracity. Rather, 
-[v]eracity is generally assumed when the information comes 
from an 'average citizen who is in a position to supply 
information by virtue of having been a crime victim or 
witness.'- State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3 (1978)). 
1. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). As understood by most courts, the 
test required strict satisfaction of a two-pronged test whenever a 
supporting affidavit relied on an informant's tip: 1) the 
affidavit must establish the -basis of knowledge- of the 
informant, and 2) the affidavit must provide facts establishing 
the informant's -veracity- or his -reliability- to the specific 
case. 
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Defendant further argues the "innocuous" facts presented in 
the affidavit are as consistent with innocent activity as with 
criminal activity. The trial court appropriately noted defendant 
"offered no evidence whatsoever as to what that equally consistent 
lawful conduct would be." To dissect the affidavit, fact by fact, 
is exactly the "hypertechnical" review the Gates test was 
reestablished to eliminate. See Upton. 466 U. S. at 732-33; 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130. Officers corroborated virtually all of 
the information received from the neighbors through their 
independent investigation and surveillance. When viewed as a 
whole, through the eyes of a trained, experienced officer, the 
facts become not so innocuous.2 
Our review of the sufficiency of the affidavit "should not 
take the form of de novo review." Gates. 462 U. S. at 236. We 
find the magistrate had a "substantial basis" of information to 
conclude probable cause existed. 
Defendant next argues Detective Smith made false statements 
in the affidavit knowingly or with reckless disregard for the 
truth. Once these false statements are removed, defendant 
contends the remaining information fails to establish probable 
cause. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U. S. 154, 155-56 (1978), held: 
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial 
preliminary showing that a false statement 
knowingly and intentionally, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth, was 
included by the affiant in the warrant 
affidavit, and if the allegedly false 
statement is necessary to the finding of 
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment 
requires that a hearing be held at the 
defendant's request. In the event that at 
that hearing the allegation of perjury or 
reckless disregard is established by the 
defendant by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and, with the affidavit's false 
material set to one side, the affidavit's 
remaining content is insufficient to 
establish probable cause, the search 
warrant must be voided and the fruits of 
the search excluded to the same extent as 
if probable cause was lacking on the face 
of the affidavit. 
2. "Police officers by virtue of their experience and training 
can sometimes recognize illegal activity where ordinary citizens 
would not. Some recognition should appropriately be given to 
that experience and training where there are objective facts to 
justify the ultimate conclusion." State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 
1085 (Utah 1986). 
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The Utah Supreme Court followed the Franks rule in State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986)• 
Defendant alleges several misstatements or false statements 
made by Smith in his affidavit. However, as the trial court 
explained in its memorandum decision, "all of the alleged 
misstatements . . . were based upon reasonably reliable 
information such as official public documents, business 
records, police reports, and conversations with sheriffs 
previously involved with the suspect." Moreover, defendant 
offered no evidence that Detective Smith knowingly or with 
reckless disregard for the truth included any allegedly false 
information in the affidavit. As the Franks decision requires, 
"There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of 
reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be 
accompanied by an offer of proof." 438 U. S. at 171. Even if 
the few allegedly false statements were removed, the remaining 
information clearly established the requisite probable cause. 
Defendant argues the facts and circumstances presented in 
the affidavit failed to justify a "no knock" warrant. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2)(1982) provides: 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment or other 
enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is 
reasonably necessary to enter: 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon 
proof, under oath, [1] that the object of 
the search may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted, or [2] that 
physical harm may result to any person if 
notice were given. 
In his affidavit, Smith requested a "no knock" warrant because 
the marijuana plants could be "quickly destroyed, disposed of, 
or secreted," and "[t]wo large watch dogs are always present 
and might pose a hazard to arresting officers." We find the 
magistrate had a sufficient basis to justify a "no knock" 
warrant on either of the two statutory grounds. In summary, we 
find no error in the trial court's ruling and therefore affirm 
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the denial of defendants motion to suppress.3 
Defendant last argues the State failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the seized substance was marijuana. At trial, 
the State presented two witnesses, Detective Smith and Kevin 
Smith, a criminalist at the Utah State Crime Laboratory. 
Detective Smith testified he had attended various narcotics 
investigation instructional courses and had worked in narcotics 
for the past two years. Upon seizing the plants, Detective 
Smith concluded they were marijuana by their smell, appearance 
and structure. Kevin Smith testified he examined the plants 
microscopically and observed hairs typical of marijuana 
plants. He also conducted chemical tests on the plants and, 
based on the test results and his observations, concluded the 
plants were marijuana. On cross examination Kevin Smith 
testified he never had any courses in botany. He also 
testified other plants have hairs like marijuana and react 
similarly to the chemical tests. 
Defendant called Dwight Fullerton, a professor at Oregon 
State University1s College of Pharmacy, and a specialist in 
plant identification. Fullerton testified that marijuana's 
structure and hairs are not unique, and many plants react 
similarly in the chemical tests. Fullerton concluded if he 
were presented with the same evidence produced by the State, he 
could not state with a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty the plants were marijuana. On rebuttal, the State 
offered the testimony of Robert Brinkman, Bureau Chief at the 
Utah State Crime Laboratory. He explained the Utah standard 
for analyzing marijuana and testified the tests involved are 
sufficient to determine with a reasonable degree of certainty 
the identification of a suspect plant. 
The trial court found that scientific tests (together with 
the objective observations of professional narcotics agents) 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the substance seized from 
defendant was marijuana. MIn reviewing a claim of insufficient 
evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict and will interfere only when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable 
person could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt.- State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 
1983). Clearly the State's evidence supports the trial 
3. The parties argue the probable cause exceptions in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-12(g) (1982). In light of our finding probable cause 
existed, we do not address these issues. 
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courtfs finding. Therefore, we affirm defendants conviction. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
R. W. Garff, Juage 
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